175 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the
648 capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security
[124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 The political relationship which the Bedouins of the
● 795 Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya
[619] was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi _tariqa_ ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955:
[793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"),
[346] al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[793] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a
182 very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
[793] Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya religious order became a political force for the Italians to reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

175 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of
•795 their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though
648 most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time
[124] basis. One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area
177 were held in check by an officially created political structure
554 which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure
631 depended upon two political roles for the control of the
648 Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

795 771 829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the [576] [708] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do [651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 177 423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
• [795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today: the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
554 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
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His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend crininals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between the government and his village. Because of his position as the representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain personal benefits.

In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that villages in the sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
[625] bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
619 reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
634 concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
[795] The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
[361] reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

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[For information on the origin, development and expansion of the Sanusi Order and its relationship to various foreign powers, notably the Italians and Turks, see Category 116, pp. 1-28, 45-46, 54, 57, 64-65, 68-93, 97-99, 102-110, 115-118, 122-123, 126-195, 204, and 226-229.]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

The Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban education and they acted as links between the citizen communities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with town merchants and officials what was happening in the world outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered. But though maintaining communications with the towns, neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on the country and not the country on the towns, because there was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber-speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies, and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically, the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the

[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of the Sanusiya properties had done.

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the *Sa'adi* tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been settled either by war or through discussion between the groups concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible. Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order established itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo-Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral–agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

Cases

593 613 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to 613 422 735 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or [556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 421 428 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are [562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that [593] wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one [593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand [584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

[77] [795] [671] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.